

Skewing the odds: Taking risks for rank-based rewards

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ICEF Conference 2015

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- If you plot on the same line the "prize density" and the equilibrium pdf over performance, they are aligned!

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- Consider the fixed capacity and the moving top of the support, otherwise it is counterintuitive!!

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- Then, if you have the equilibrium conjecture, why to care about the performance strategy? Just try not to exceed what the others at most can do!

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- Then the equilibrium could emerge also through learning.