28 апреля в 16:40 - Научный семинар Марии Гольцман "On the Optimality of Diverse Expert Panels in Persuasion Games" совместно с Sourav Bhattacharya и Arijit Mukherjee

Место проведения: Шаболовка, 26 ауд. 3211

В четверг 28 апреля в 16.40 в ауд. 3211 (ул. Шаболовка, 26) пройдет научный семинар Международного института экономики и финансов и Международной лаборатории финансовой экономики.
Докладчик: Мария Гольцман (University of Western Ontario) <Curriculum Vitae>
Тема доклада: "On the Optimality of Diverse Expert Panels in Persuasion Games" совместно с Sourav Bhattacharya и Arijit Mukherjee

Тезисы доклада: We consider a persuasion game where the decision-maker relies on a panel of biased experts. An expert's preference is parameterized by his ideal action, or agenda. Common intuition suggests that more information is revealed if the panel includes experts with opposed agendas, because such experts will undo each other’s attempts to conceal unfavorable information. In contrast, we show that recruiting experts with diverse agendas is optimal only if the correlation between the experts' signals is above a threshold. Moreover, if the experts' signals are independent conditional on the true state of nature, under mild assumptions it is optimal to recruit experts who have extreme but identical agendas. These findings suggest that the diversity of preferences must be considered in conjunction with the diversity of information sources, and it is generally sub-optimal to seek diversity in both dimensions.

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