Научный семинар лаборатории финансовой экономики

Во вторник (21.05.13) в 11.00  состоятся доклады двух сотрудников лаборатории финансовой экономики МИЭФ. Ауд. 3402

Докладчики:

• Станими Морфов (МИЭФ) Тема доклада: Short-Term versus Long-Term Incentives
• Владимир Соколов (ICEF) Тема доклада: Bailout of Strategic Industry Firms: Government Target Selection Decisions and their Consequences

 

Место и время:Shabolovka st. 26, Room 3402

Short-Term versus Long-Term Incentives
Abstract: This paper considers the provision of long-term incentives in a principal-agent model with
e¤ort persistence. We analyze how the degree of substitutability between short- and long-
term tasks a¤ects compensation and the optimal contract. We demonstrate that a long-term
contract with no threat of interim replacement can focus on short-term incentives because of
an interaction between agent’s e¤ort choice and the value of her outside option.
Bailout of Strategic Industry Firms: Government Target Selection Decisions and their Consequences
Abstract: This paper investigates the effectiveness and impact of government bailout assistance on strategic firms experiencing financial constraints after a credit supply shock. We use the corporate bailout program implemented by the Russian government during the 2008 financial crisis as a case study, and examine how pre-crisis financial characteristics of firms affected decisions on bailout assistance. Our results show that the allocation of funds was significantly affected by the industry affiliation of the sample firms, as well as by their operational and financial performance during the pre-crisis period. We also examine whether government bailout assistance enhances the performance of recipient-firms in the post-bailout period. Using propensity score matching and a difference-in-difference framework, we find that non-recipient firms significantly increased their tangible fixed assets and equity relative to recipients in the post-bailout period. At the same time, recipient-firms significantly increased their long-term debt and working capital, while decreasing their construction-in-progress. These findings suggest that the Russian government’s bailout policies did not have an expected positive impact on the performance of firms-recipients, and the deterioration of the corporate governance is a possible explanation for this as suggested by Rajan and Subramanian (2007).